| Description |
1 online resource (xiv, 230 pages) : illustrations |
| Series |
ISTE |
|
ISTE.
|
| Note |
Adaption and rev. of: Les signaux faibles et la veille anticipative pour les decideurs. 2011. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Contents |
Contents note continued: 1.4.2. Difference between strategic information and day-to-day management information -- 1.4.3. Two types of anticipative information -- 1.5. Weak signals -- 1.5.1. Definition of a weak signal -- 1.5.2. An example of weak signal as the trigger to a warning -- 1.5.3. Should we prefer a "strong" but backward-looking signal, or a "weak" but forward-looking signal? -- 1.5.4. Conversion, transformation of a weak signal into an early warning signal -- 1.5.5. Should we refer to a "signal" or a "sign"? Intentionality of the sender -- 1.5.6. Weak signals ... or decoys, deceptions, and information asymmetry -- 1.5.7. Characteristics of a weak signal: "Stealthy information" -- 1.5.8. Sources emitting weak signals: Examples -- 1.6. Detecting weak signals -- 1.6.1. Individual intelligence (in the Latin sense of the word): A definition -- 1.6.2. Cognitive style of a person -- 1.6.3. Individual cognitive biases -- 1.6.4. Fear. |
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Contents note continued: 1.7. Interpreting, amplifying and exploiting weak signals to support strategic decision making -- 1.7.1. Need for collective intelligence (CI) for interpreting weak signals -- 1.7.2. CM: Justification and definition of the process -- 1.7.3. Definition of CI as the emergence of CCM -- 1.7.4. From CCM to knowledge management -- 1.8. Puzzle® method for the operationalization of CCM -- 1.8.1. Issue: Why the puzzle metaphor? -- 1.8.2. Definition of the Puzzle® method -- 1.8.3. Fundamental hypotheses of the Puzzle® method -- 1.8.4. Work group and CI -- 1.9. Global VASIC process for detecting, recognizing and utilizing weak signals -- 1.9.1. Targeting of anticipative scanning and information sources -- 1.9.2. Tracking and individual selection of weak signals -- 1.9.3. Escalating information, collective/centralized selection and storage -- 1.9.4. Dissemination and preparation of information for CCM sessions -- 1.9.5. Animation. |
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Contents note continued: 1.9.6. Measurements: Performance indicators of the VASIC process -- 1.10. Conclusion -- 1.10.1. Results on completion of Chapter 1 -- ch. 2 Detecting, Recognizing and Corroborating a Weak Signal: Applications -- 2.1. Recognition of a weak signal: Examples -- 2.1.1.A lady heading up the purchasing function at a car equipment manufacturer? How bizarre! -- 2.1.2. When a weak signal is displayed on a sign in the street! -- 2.1.3.A research center at EADS: Why Singapore? -- 2.1.4. Danone -- 2.2. Making a new weak signal reliable -- 2.2.1. Reliability of the information source -- 2.2.2.Comparing the weak signal with other information obtained previously -- 2.2.3. Consulting with an "expert" -- 2.2.4. Feedback from the animator to the gatekeeper who provided the weak signal -- 2.3. Conclusion -- 2.3.1. Result -- ch. 3 Utilization of Weak Signals, Collective Creation of Meaning: Applications. |
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Contents note continued: 3.1. The Roger case: Should we fear this new entrant to our industry? (the banking sector) -- 3.1.1. Issues for Roger as a company -- 3.1.2. Context -- 3.1.3. Codexi -- 3.1.4. Information to be used -- 3.1.5. Conduct of the collective work session -- 3.1.6. Results -- 3.2. The case for "valorizing CO2 as a commodity": A preliminary study for the selection of a new strategic direction -- 3.2.1. The main problem: How to "give birth to an idea" within the Board of Directors (BoD)? -- 3.2.2. Challenge: Arousing the interest of the BoD -- 3.2.3. Preparing for the session (which will prove to be the first session) -- 3.2.4. Background of the experiment (first session) -- 3.2.5. Conduct of the session (first session) -- 3.2.6. Second session, three months later -- 3.2.7. Conclusion and post-scriptum -- 3.3. The Danone case. The ministry is worried: Are there signs showing that companies will destroy jobs over the next two years? Could Danone leave France? |
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Contents note continued: 3.3.1. The issue at hand -- 3.3.2. Fresh interest in weak signals -- 3.3.3. Background: Lack of cross-disciplinarity -- 3.3.4.Organization and conduct of the experiment -- 3.3.5. Targeting of a field of study -- 3.3.6. Selection of Danone as an agent -- 3.3.7. Conduct of the CCM experiment -- 3.3.8. Conclusion at the close of the last session: Huge plausible risk on the horizon! -- 3.4. The Opel case: Initiating collective transversal intelligence to aid strategic decision-making -- 3.4.1. Issues and background -- 3.4.2. CI -- 3.4.3.Organizational context -- 3.4.4. Preparatory step upstream of the first CCM session -- 3.4.5. Conduct of the CCM session -- 3.4.6. Conclusions -- 3.5. Conclusion -- 3.5.1. Results -- ch. 4 Preparation of Weak Signals for Sessions in Collective Creation of Meaning: Applications -- 4.1. Introduction: Two starting situations -- 4.2. The Roger case (continued): How are the news briefs used in the Roger CCM session prepared? |
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Contents note continued: 4.2.1. Preparation of the news briefs used in the CCM -- 4.2.2. The search for raw data: A substantial task -- 4.2.3. Extraction of news briefs: A time-consuming, delicate task -- 4.2.4. The Internet trap -- 4.3.COM2 valorization case: Automatic search for "news briefs" -- 4.3.1. Guiding idea: "Full text" distillation -- 4.3.2. Steps in the search for "possible weak signal" news briefs -- 4.4. The Danone case: Preparation of the weak signals -- 4.4.1."Manual" search -- 4.4.2."Manual" extraction -- 4.4.3. Automatic news briefs search and extraction -- 4.4.4. Conclusions on the "CO2 valorization" and "Danone" cases using the Approxima prototype -- 4.5. Software modules for assisting in the automatic search for news briefs -- 4.5.1. Lookup table of characteristic words for the field being explored. Continuation of the "CO2 valorization" case -- 4.5.2. Enhancing the anticipative-and characteristic-word bases. |
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Contents note continued: 4.5.3. Semantics problems: Synonyms, polysemes and related matters -- 4.5.4. Software enabling "event searches" -- 4.5.5. Integration platform for commercially available software modules -- 4.6. Conclusion -- 4.6.1. Result. |
| Language |
English adaptation of: Les signaux faibles et la veille anticipative pour les décideurs. |
| Summary |
The expression "We did not see it coming!" has often been heard in recent years from decision makers at the highest levels of the private and public sectors. Yet there were actually early warning signals, but they were often ignored due to a lack of appropriate methodology. Focusing on the concept of a weak signal, this book provides methods for anticipating problems and dealing with blind spots. Along with examples of this concept, the authors provide answers to questions of feasibility, including how to recognize a weak signal, and how to exploit it. Numerous applications are also presented throughout. |
| Subject |
Strategic planning.
|
|
Management.
|
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Planification stratégique. |
|
Gestion. |
|
management. |
|
Management |
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Strategic planning |
| Added Author |
Lesca, Nicolas.
|
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Lesca, Humbert.
Signaux faibles et la veille anticipative pour les decideurs.
|
| Other Form: |
Print version: Lesca, Humbert. Weak signals for strategic intelligence. London : ISTE; Hoboken, N.J. : Wiley, ©2011 9781848213180 (DLC) 2011031444 (OCoLC)745766015 |
| ISBN |
9781118602874 (electronic bk.) |
|
1118602870 (electronic bk.) |
|
9781118602775 (electronic bk.) |
|
1118602773 (electronic bk.) |
|
9781118602812 (electronic bk.) |
|
1118602811 (electronic bk.) |
|
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