| Description |
1 online resource (1 volume) |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Contents |
Cover -- Don't be fooled again -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Crises -- not all bad -- We must have missed something -- The never-ending crisis -- Common features of financial crises, and why we don't see them coming -- The broad background -- Financial deregulation: doors to opportunity and distress -- The magic trick of money -- Confusion at the heart of money -- The special privileges of banks -- Litany of attempts to solve a perennial problem -- Asset prices and credit -- What were we thinking? -- Confused investment and channel capacity -- Keep it down! -- The basis of market economics: an ability to agree terms -- From auction to liquid marketplace -- Highly liquid markets create their own money -- Technology and the emergence of new value -- 'Logistics and statistics': twins from the same parent -- More potential participants increase the market price of an asset -- Time and investment -- Conservative investors: the perfect bubble-blowers -- Not exactly classical -- The propagation of market crises, even with no prospect of default -- Why we do not see financial crises coming? -- Did the Asian crisis teach us nothing? -- Asia's crisis: first of the globalised era -- Wounded Tiger: Thailand and the crisis of 1997-98 -- Hedge funds strike it rich -- A profound effect on Chinese policy -- Aftermath in property: ruin, folly and delusion -- Lessons for China -- The International Monetary Fund responds -- Initial response: support at a price -- Sell high, buy other countries low -- The aftermath, and what we should have learned -- America benefits, but does it learn? -- Loving the dollar: lessons from a great flood of capital -- The shock appearance of money -- A trillion-dollar proof against the capitalists -- Foreign civil servants oust private investment -- The poor lend money to the wealthiest -- The unbalanced globe. |
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Crowding out the usual crowd -- The slow flow from Japan -- 'Housewives of Tokyo' disrupt international finance -- The 'search for yield' drives Japanese banks abroad -- An early global tremor -- Japan's capital exports: still more to come -- Echoes of Japan in the West -- The euro: an exercise in imbalance -- Convergence creates its own challenges -- Opportunity for second-rate banks -- The global meaning of money -- How central banks lost their grip -- Japan's lost decade: prelude to international disorder -- The origins of the Japanese banking crisis -- Influence of 'globalisation' on Japan's economy -- The Asian crisis, bail-out and a regional disaster -- Belated regulation: worse than nothing -- Quantitative easing, its wider impact and the flow of money -- The Fed and the bail-out of Long Term Capital Management -- LTCM: birth and growth -- 'Convergence': politics and profit -- Beginning of the end -- The Fed saves the world -- The Greenspan put -- Greenspan and dot-com -- Greenspan confuses progress with irrationality -- A law for financial expansion -- Greenspan jumps on the Exuberance Express -- Y2K: the crash of optimism version 1.0 -- Downturn in the new century -- ILoveYou: a new disease -- The focus switches -- September 2001 -- Japan's dark presence -- The liquidity generator unleashed -- Long-term faith in an American future -- In Europe: equal rates for unequal countries -- Follow the Fed -- Local imbalances -- Collusion in liquidity -- Going fishing: lessons of financial innovation -- Why innovation is needed -- The dangers of uncritical acceptance of orthodoxy -- The risk revolution: innovation for all -- Efficiency or avoidance? -- Why derivatives are so important -- Merton and 'convergence -- Swapping efficiency -- Bringing liquidity to the illiquid -- What can go wrong? -- Lower cost, higher competition. |
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The star innovation of avoidance was securitisation -- The downside to securitisation -- Staggering growth rates -- Working ever faster -- The shadow banking system, distorted money and SIVs -- Computers change everything -- What's the future of financial innovation? -- In God We Trust: banks and their errors -- The bill so far -- Tensions arise -- Originate and distribute becomes 'originate and hoard' -- An era of free money -- Why mortgages? -- The Great Moderation -- We're losing money, buy more bonds! -- Originate and distribute, the case of UBS -- Subprime securities as 'central bank money' -- How to place 'value at risk' -- High pay policies -- Banks writedowns are a loss of Western wealth -- De-rated: how ratings agencies and regulations failed -- Rating agencies: uncontrolled private regulation -- Basel I and II: regulatory innovation -- The problem with regulations -- The politics of housing -- An unproductive asset -- A unique housing model, with familiar results -- The politics of home ownership -- Clinton's third way -- social inclusion and market economics -- The overlap of politics and bankers -- Beyond domestic politics -- A change of politics -- a change of subprime -- European political distortions in lending -- Eurocrats and euro-lending -- The politics of tax -- Is it the same everywhere? Why some countries boom -- But why housing? -- Blinded by ratings -- The conspiracy of housing finance -- It's not all bad: the costs and benefits of financial crises -- The unsustainable has run its course -- Dear old Stockholm -- and Helsinki -- They run, chanting revolution -- Not so relaxed: recovery in Thailand -- Japan: what recovery? -- Where's the good in bubbles and busts? -- A complex of crises: 1970 to 2009 -- The internet: too early to tell -- What lessons for the future? -- Whose reserves are they anyway? -- The future of America. |
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A long-term faith in the new -- A never-ending crisis -- Challenges to central banks and exporters -- A new role for hedge funds -- What kind of regulatory change? -- Too many crises and yet not enough -- Index. |
| Summary |
The decade which began in July 1997 saw a global financial system that generated more wealth for more people for a much longer period of time than any other in financial history. But ten years later, in a seemingly sudden move, there was a flight of capital and a collapse of the global banking system. What went wrong? Did anyone see it coming? What lessons can we learn from this? And is it really all that bad? Fooled Again is not a history book, but it looks at the history of recent financial management, mismanagement, extraordinary risk and greed, flows of global capital and international toxic balance sheets to identity the key lessons to be learned from the global financial crisis. Taking a considered and long-term view, Meyrick Chapman gives an immensely readable and insightful view of what really happened and shows us why not all crises are bad, and why the events of 2008 and 2009 may ultimately benefit us. |
| Subject |
Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.
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Financial crises -- Prevention.
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Finance -- Management.
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Crise financière mondiale, 2008-2009. |
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Finances -- Gestion. |
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Finance -- Management |
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Financial crises -- Prevention |
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Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009) |
| Chronological Term |
2008-2009 |
| Added Title |
Lessons in the good, bad and unpredictable behaviour of global finance |
|
Do not be fooled again |
| ISBN |
9780273745167 |
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0273745166 |
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